Abstract: This article challenges the received wisdom that French public opinion was infused with pacifist sentiment during the 1930s, and that this sentiment in turn contributed to the French defeat of 1940. It will suggest that French public attitudes towards the prospect of war can be better defined as 'war anxiety' rather than the value-laden term 'pacifist'. Taking as a test case the period between the Munich Agreement of September 1938 and the outbreak of the Second World War less than a year later, the article will tease out the necessary distinction between 'pacifism' and 'war anxiety'. By employing a notion of 'representations' of public opinion, it will be shown how French opinion was demonstrably less pacifist than many existing analyses assume. Instead, it will be contended that the public's anxieties with regard to a future war manifested themselves in a variety of ways, of which pacifism was merely one marginal example. Indeed, 'war anxiety' increasingly demanded that France prepare for an inevitable conflict, in stark contrast to simply retreating into a defeatist mindset and thus establishing the conditions for the defeat in 1940.
representations, but nonetheless retained sufficient power to be habitually projected onto perceptions of current opinion.
It is within this category of representation that pacifism was prominent. Such was the pervasiveness of the idea that French society had assumed a pacifist tinge following the carnage and horror of the Great War that it formed a potent 'residual' representation of public opinion, persuading the policymaking elites that French opinion remained pacifist throughout the interwar years. It was thus difficult to conceive that the majority of the people would, just twenty years later, have abandoned this sentiment to the extent that they would favour resistance to appeasement. This article will suggest that residual representations of opinion can be overemphasized, interpreted in such a way as to distort reality by means of a dominant and vocal minority providing formative representations that are subsequently projected onto the wider corpus of opinion. As Jean-Noël Jeanneney asserts, 'the intense opinion of an active minority often exerts more pressure on proceedings than the half-hearted reactions of an indifferent majority'. 7 Moreover, such a residual representation can become so pervasive that it retains a potentially unrepresentative influence, stubbornly refusing to yield to the changes and fluctuations of opinion(s) in response to the progression of time and events. Indeed, they become, to borrow from James Joll, 'unspoken assumptions '. 8 In interwar France, pacifism was a peculiarly pervasive representation of public opinion. It is widely held that French opinion was, if not pacifist, certainly infused with an anxiety regarding the prospect of war.
However, clearly differentiating between pacifism and a more widespread anxiety regarding the 'next' war facilitates a more accurate understanding of the public's apprehensions regarding the prospect of war. Of particular interest here is the prospect of aerial bombardment, and how technological advancements since the Great War meant that any future conflict would be target. Rather, the French used Tours, or Dijon, or Reims, or, especially, Paris'. 9 Similarly, Robert Paxton notes that, 'War meant poison gas and the bombing of cities. Paris would be worse than Guernica'. 10 However, such fears are better characterized as manifestations of war anxiety rather than pacifism. In contradistinction from pacifism, war anxiety was neither an explicit fear of war nor a deeply-held conviction that war was unjustifiable. Similarly it would not automatically manifest itself as defeatism in the event of war. This distinction between pacifism and waranxiety -or more accurately, anxiety as regards the 'next war' -is one that needs to be made. It is rather crude simply to label the desire for peace as pacifism (in all its guises, ideological, doctrinal, religious etc.). Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that as war became increasingly likely, the distinction between pacifism and a more intangible 'anxiety', or even 'fear' of war became more conspicuous. Such an anxiety was arguably far more widespread than pacifism, in the stricter definition of the term. Moreover, it was shared by the public and policymaking elites alike.
Therefore, during the period 1938-9, the marginalization of doctrinal pacifism ensured that the residual representation of widespread French pacifism was gradually superseded. This did not, however, occur rapidly, as the idea of a pacifist French society was particularly entrenched. During the preceding years, pacifist doctrine had been espoused by numerous pacifist organizations, politicians and within the popular press. Consequently, the sentiments of a vocal minority were perceived to be a mirror of mainstream opinion. This is, of course, unsurprising, as the aftermath of the First World War provided a perfect environment in which pacifism could flourish, nurturing a deep-rooted conviction that it never be repeated. also how they manifested themselves as a 'patriotic pacifism', encapsulating a widespread disdain for war without undermining loyalty to the Republic. 22 Furthermore, Siegel rightly notes that French schoolteachers' pacifism did not foster 'an atmosphere of decadence'; by contrast, their patriotic pacifism helps explain why, when the 'Republic was directly threatened, French men and women overwhelmingly rallied to its defence'. 23 Although numerous varieties of pacifism have been detected, the tendency to employ a more nebulous conception is problematic. The multifaceted nature of public opinion means that employing such terminology inevitably results in over-simplification. Pacifism is simply a single term used to describe multifarious attitudes. As Pierre Laborie observes, the only area of convergence is the aspiration for peace. 24 War anxiety, therefore, is a better label for such a multitude of attitudes, avoiding the over-simplification that ensues when applying the more valueladen term 'pacifism'. Indeed, Norman Ingram has alluded to a similar concept in defining the pacifisme nouveau style that emerged in the late 1920s, suggesting that it was partially defined by an anxiety regarding the next war. 25 Pacifism, he suggests, was appealing by virtue of the 'increasing sense that another war could destroy civilization because of the progress made by science and technology since the end of the Great War'. 26 Ingram's analysis is informed by Martin Ceadel's typology, particularly the latter's definition of the 'modern-war pacifists' who argued that just wars were no longer possible 'in view of the indiscriminate destructiveness of modern technology'. 27 Consequently, 'modern-war pacifists' were 'the first to believe that it was possible to show, on a utilitarian calculation of the likely pros and cons, that no future war could ever be worth fighting'. 28 applied only to overtly pacifist organisations rather than mainstream French opinion, resulting in an analysis explicitly confined to 'those men, women and organizations in interwar France for whom peace was a primary, consistent, and overriding concern and goal'. 29 War anxiety, however, was not confined to these individuals or organizations. Attachment to peace was widespread in interwar France and it is therefore essential that the application of war anxiety is not confined to those with a developed and politicized pacifism. Although the LICP was a marginal organisation, such reactive representations served to reinforce the residual perception of a pacifist French public. However, it was not only doctrinal pacifists who were deeply unsettled by the prospect of war. As Norman Ingram has noted, 'In a country which had borne the brunt of the Great War public opinion and politicians alike took seriously the pacifist cry 'plus jamais ça! '' 33 As the Czechoslovakian crisis threatened to escalate into war, the residual representation of pacifism constrained French policymakers.
Moreover, contemporary events exacerbated a more widespread war anxiety.
The horror and revulsion provoked by the news and imagery of modern warfare in Spain heightened the conviction that such events must not be 31 Chamberlain', wrote Blum, '[is] a chance for peace …. That is why I applaud … we applaud all that renders war more difficult'. 46 and the people will throw me into the river'. 50 The policymaking elites were acutely conscious of a widespread war anxiety, as practically everyone in France were apprehensive of the potential repercussions of a FrancoGerman conflict. But a lack of enthusiasm for war is not indicative of pacifism, and few preached a policy of peace at any price. The dominant reactive representations of opinion indicated that whilst there was, as Blum put it, a 'chance of peace', this had to be seized. War anxiety rather than pacifism thus ensured that the Munich Agreement would be embraced. 47 On 23 September, Halifax sent a telegram to Chamberlain at Godesberg, noting: 'Great mass of public opinion seems to be hardening in sense of feeling that we have gone to the limit of concession'. D 
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Daladier, much to his surprise, returned from Munich to a hero's welcome. 51 The initial fervour that welcomed the maintenance of peace appeared to most contemporary observers as heartfelt, genuine, and thoroughly understandable. Confirmation of this widespread sentiment was provided by the newspaper OEuvre, which noted that of the letters they had received from the public on the issue of Munich, 4,555 approved the agreement with only 193 voicing dissent. 52 Furthermore, it was not only the French press that lavished praise on the British Prime Minister, as many French towns renamed streets in his honour, umbrellas were referred to as 'mon Chamberlain', and a new dance, 'Le Chamberlain', swept Paris. 53 The overriding reactive representation of opinion in the immediate aftermath of Munich was relief that war had been averted, reinforcing the residual representation of a society so infused with pacifist sentiment that recourse to war was unthinkable.
Support for Munich was also evident in parliamentary circles, with only the communists, the nationalist deputy Henri de Kérillis, and a sole socialist deputy voting against them in the French Chamber. Indeed, even Socialists who had abandoned pacifism welcomed the maintenance of peace.
As Blum told the Chamber, 'The French people feel an immense elation to have avoided a war that had been so close'. 54 This was amply reflected during the final days of peace. As JeanBaptiste Duroselle has noted, the French Cabinet was divided between the 'resisters' and the 'pacifists'. 82 Beyond the Cabinet, several other influential figures were also reluctant to maintain the Polish commitment, including Jean Mistler, the President of the Foreign Affairs Commission in the French however, remained the most influential 'pacifist', and on 1 September he urged the British government to share his conviction that, 'until the last moment, no effort be neglected in attempting to restore the peace'. 83 Similarly, die-hard advocates of 'neo-pacifism' such as Flandin pleaded that peace 'is still possible'. 84 Of course, French leaders were aware that French opinion was not enthused by the prospect of war. On 26 August, Daladier addressed a personal message to the German Chancellor, as one war veteran to another, re-iterating French determination to uphold her pledges to Poland, although expressing the hope that a peaceful solution to the Danzig imbroglio could be found. Daladier once more reflected a general war anxiety in prophesizing the repercussions of a conflict: 'If French and German blood is spilt again …, in a longer and bloodier war, then both will fight confident of their own
victory. But what is most certain is that devastation and barbarism will be the victor'. 85 Moreover, in his radio broadcast to the French people on 3 September, Daladier stressed that France, a peaceful nation, was only going to war 'because it has been imposed on us'. 86 This interpretation was echoed throughout the French press. 'War has been imposed on France and she has no choice but to fight', was the verdict of l'Intransigeant. 87 Similarly, Blum argued that 'the Nazis have compelled the most peaceful of nations to go to war for the defence of her liberty, existence and honour'. 88 For the French government, reactive representations of opinion since Munich indicated that the majority of the French population was morally prepared for war. 89 Although war was certainly not desired, it was accepted, and the lingering anxieties regarding the prospect of war did not equate to a visceral pacifism that made a French defeat inevitable. 90 If war remained, as Talbot Imlay has suggested, 'an unacceptable prospect for large sections of the French political spectrum', elite perceptions of public opinion persuaded them that war had been reluctantly accepted. 91 The fact that these representations yielded so rapidly suggests that they were never an accurate barometer of wider French opinion; they were simply more voluble, creating the impression that pacifism was more widespread than was actually the case. Of course, pacifist doctrine appealed to many French men and women, as no-one desired war. But this desire to avoid war can be better defined as war anxiety. Indeed, in the post-Munich period, reactive representations of opinion suggested that the only way to avoid war was to deter Germany through French strength and resolve. In essence, therefore, war anxiety is compatible with a determination to fight.
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this article to trace the evolution of opinion during the drôle de guerre -a subject worthy of a study in its own right -it can be concluded that French opinion at the start of the Second World War was certainly not riddled with pacifism and defeatism. Consequently, the conditions for the defeat of 1940 -and subsequently for Vichy -were far from established. 90 Robert Frank has argued that, although the Daladier government enjoyed some successes in preparing France for war, it was never able to overcome the widespread pacifism that continued to haunt France even after the outbreak of war. La hantise du decline: la France, 1920 France, -1960 
